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OPTIMAL COMPETITIVE BALANCE IN A SEASON TICKET LEAGUE
RODNEY FORT and JAMES QUIRK
Theory predicts that a planner maximizing the sum of fan and owner surpluses
from a league dominated by season ticket sales may prefer more, less, or the same
level of competitive balance produced by a league of profit-maximizing owners. The
optimal level of balance depends on the relationship between marginal impacts of
talent rearrangements in larger-revenue and smaller-revenue markets. Ultimately, then,
judging whether an increase in balance enhances welfare rests on careful and thorough
empirical investigation. Our reading of the literature and the policy debate shows that
this careful work remains to be done. (JEL D6, L83)
There is no question the level of play has decreased.
Now, do games become more exciting? Are teams
more evenly matched? No question. Is that good for
the game or not? I don’t know. I really don’t know.
I ask that question all the time.
—NFL Hall of Fame Quarterback Troy Aikman,
quoted in Pedulla (2003).
I think that margin of competition, that margin of the
difference between winning and losing in this league
is very small, and I think that is great for the fans
because every team comes in with an opportunity
to win.
—NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell, quoted in
Curran (2008).
I. INTRODUCTION
In this article, we lay out the basic welfare
foundation of optimal competitive balance for
regular season play in a “closed” sports league
where season tickets dominate sales. This setting
best describes the National Football League
(NFL), economically the most important of the
four major North American leagues (NALs).
We handle the case of single-ticket leagues like
baseball in Fort and Quirk (2010). Our chosen
focus is on balance during the regular season and
details of all our modeling choices are given in
the next section.
The quotes given above help to illuminate
the policy issue addressed by the theory. Is the
NFL too balanced as Hall of Fame Quarterback
Troy Aikman’s quote suggests? Or is the level
Fort: Sport Management, School of Kinesiology, University
of Michigan, 1402 Washington Heights, Rm. 3150, Ann
Arbor, MI 48109-2013. E-mail rodfort@umich.edu
Quirk: Division of Humanities and Social Science, Califor-
nia Institute of Technology (Retired)
of parity on the field somehow “optimal” as
suggested in Commissioner Goodell’s quote?
Congressional hearings (U.S. Senate 2001) have
even been convened on the subject in the
remaining NALs.
For the policy-oriented literature, it is implic-
itly taken that more balance would be an
improvement over the result generated by the
leagues themselves (comprehensive reviews are
in Fort 2006a; Fort and Quirk 1995; Szymanski
2003). This debate—among fans, reporters, and
economists—lacks anything remotely resembl-
ing any competitive balance target, for example,
an optimal level of competitive balance. From
the perspective of optimality constructs, this
intuitive belief that enhancing competitive bal-
ance would on net enhance general fan welfare
may simply be Pareto noncomparable advocacy.
Rottenberg (1956) was the first to detail the
problems associated with a lack of competi-
tive balance. If outcomes on the field, court,
or ice become too predictable, as when there
are only a few very dominant teams, fans of
perennially unsuccessful teams may stay away
in droves and some teams in the league may
actually go under. Also, even the teams that
survive will have lower revenues if these disil-
lusioned fans forsake the sport altogether. Thus,
leagues have a vested interest in managing
the level of competitive balance. The point of
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departure for this article is how the league’s
profit-maximizing choice of competitive balance
deviates from one specification of the social
welfare-maximizing level of balance.
We address the question of optimal com-
petitive balance comparing decentralized league
outcomes to the level of competitive balance
that maximizes the sum of consumers’ and pro-
ducers’ surpluses. We realize that other possible
Pareto optimal outcomes might be developed,
but the surplus maximizing approach does have
the virtue of utilizing theoretical tools that are
conceptually amenable to relatively straightfor-
ward measurement and comparison in actual
leagues. In particular, our main result is that
whether the decentralized league result is too
much or too little balance, relative to the surplus-
maximizing level, is an empirical matter. If the
marginal impacts of talent rearrangements are
larger in smaller-revenue markets than in larger-
revenue markets, then welfare is enhanced by
rearranging talent to create more balance. But if
the reverse is true, then less balance enhances
social welfare. The elements required to actu-
ally assess this relationship, namely available
data and careful empirical analysis, can settle
the issue.
We also are not blind to the fact that some
advocacy of particular mechanisms to enhance
balance actually may be thinly veiled attempts
to redistribute wealth from players to owners
and among owners. But that is another virtue
of our exercise. Future assessments of the dis-
tributional consequences of various approaches
to competitive balance can now proceed with a
firm grasp of the optimal target.
The article proceeds as follows. In Section II,
we compare the decentralized league model and
planner’s optimum for leagues that heavily uti-
lize season ticket sales. Our analysis identifies
the conditions that determine whether the plan-
ner would prefer more or less balance than
this type of league will produce in its decen-
tralized equilibrium. Section III lays out the
policy implications. All our findings suggest
that whether more balance is preferred to less
rests on empirical questions that have yet to be
assessed. Conclusions and suggestions for future
research are given in Section IV.
II. OPTIMAL COMPETITIVE BALANCE
IN A ‘‘SEASON TICKET’’ LEAGUE
In some leagues, season ticket sales dominate
team revenue functions. For example, the NFL
has only eight home games and two preseason
games to sell. Team Marketing Report (2008)
tabulates average seat prices weighted by the
proportions of different types of seats in stadi-
ums for all NFL teams. The highest of these is
about $118 per game suggesting a season ticket
price of approximately $1,180. If the team per-
forms below expectations, fans have only lost
the value of the few games they then choose
not to attend. So, football owners are able to
do what every owner would like to do, namely,
transfer the risk that the team performs below
expectations to fans. Fans confronted primarily
with season ticket options must make their esti-
mate of the value of that purchase primarily on
the quality of the home team. Further, in terms
of postseason chances, every game in the NFL
is more important to fans, even those against
poorer opponents, dampening the importance of
visiting team quality in the fan purchase deci-
sion. Our first modeling choice is to focus on
a season ticket league and we will assume that
demand depends upon own ticket price and the
team’s own winning percent.
For our second modeling choice, the sea-
son ticket league is analyzed using the “closed
league,” competitive talent equilibrium model
(originally, El Hodiri and Quirk 1971). Members
of a closed league essentially face a completely
inelastic supply of talent; “open league” mem-
bers might increase their talent by importing it
from some other league. The NFL, in particu-
lar, is distinguished on the closed league basis
from other world leagues (e.g., world football).
Recently, there has been some international tal-
ent migration in the other NALs.
The competitive talent market distinction is
best portrayed by the classical Walrasian taton-
nement referee. Using all the information on the
impacts of one team’s talent choice on the other
teams in the league, the referee’s price comes
to rest where no league member would change
their talent choice. While we find this competi-
tive process acceptable for our needs, especially
for NALs, we note that the veracity of the com-
petitive talent market choice is currently under
contention (see Fort 2006b; Fort and Quirk
2007; Szymanski 2004; Szymanski and Kesenne
2004). Fort and Quirk (2007) also provide an
argument to the effect that the common knowl-
edge requirement of rational expectations equi-
librium is satisfied for closed, competitive talent
market sports leagues. Formulating our welfare
problem in a rational expectations framework
would simply add more complications to what is
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a very complicated problem (even in the present
Walrasian case). Further, there is no need to
delve into any mechanisms used to alter the
league outcome, such as revenue sharing, in
order to derive our comparisons between the
league and the planner. The impacts of revenue
sharing in a rational expectations equilibrium for
this type of model are dealt with in Fort and
Quirk (2007).
We also model owners as choosing a sin-
gle price, rather than as price discriminators. As
is well known from welfare economics, perfect
price discrimination would lead the planner and
the league to choose the same talent distribution,
although the distribution of wealth would likely
be different in the two cases. In the NFL, sus-
picions of price discrimination might be fueled
by the presence of personal seat licenses (PSLs),
for example. A PSL is a lump-sum payment that
guarantees its holder the right to purchase a par-
ticular season ticket into perpetuity. Thus, PSLs
resemble two-part prices that might be devices
extracting consumers’ surpluses. Additional sus-
picions are raised when PSLs are auctioned
since auctions also can be surplus extraction
devices. Recently, the New York Jets were able
to auction front-row seats around the 45 yd line
for $82,000 each (Waszak 2008).
We ignore price discrimination for a number
of reasons (and discuss auctions shortly). First,
the degree to which PSLs really are a price dis-
crimination mechanism is debatable. If selling
rights to consecutive season tickets really is an
attempt at price discrimination then, just as with
magazine subscriptions, we would expect to see
some form of inter-temporal “two-for one deal”
marketing approach, but we do not.
Second, just as a season ticket sells a differ-
ent product than a single-game ticket, namely,
rights to seat location for the entire season, PSLs
also sell a different product than a standard sea-
son ticket. Under a PSL, the rights to a partic-
ular seat, in a particular location, are lifetime
rights. If the PSL replaces a lifetime-rights sea-
son ticket, there is no additional value. But if
the PSL adds a lifetime right (as it clearly did
for the New York Giants, given previous ticket-
holder laments) then value is created. Further,
depending on the package, the PSL grants other
access to food and services.
Third, the variation in PSL prices across fans
is based upon willingness to pay for different
locations, a different experience altogether. The
price of New York Giants’ PSLs ranges from
$1,000 to $20,000 per seat with more than half
of the seats costing at least $5,000 (Vacchiano
2008). The PSL does not include the price of
the tickets.
Fourth, it ends up that season tickets pur-
chased under PSL rights can be resold in the
NFL’s official “secondary ticket market” created
in 2007 (Veiga 2007). Indeed, PSLs themselves
can be completely unbundled from the associ-
ated season ticket and sold separately, online
(e.g., www.seasonticketrights.com). Preclusion
of resale is typically thought to be a prerequisite
for successful price discrimination.
The final reason for which we ignore price
discrimination follows from practical observa-
tion on owner choices to centralize signifi-
cant revenue portions, through their league, to
be redistributed equally among owners. Espe-
cially, in the season-ticket dominated NFL, tele-
vision revenues, branded team merchandise, and
emerging electronic rights have all been central-
ized through the league. We join Kahn (2007)
in observing that centralizing revenues at the
league level limits the degree to which surpluses
can be captured.
As for auctions, the price discrimination
idea is that buyers will be lined up in order
of willingness to pay so that surpluses are
extracted. In addition, a PSL auction makes
resale of season tickets different from the usual
dissipation of consumer surplus; the surplus may
not go to the reseller who bought tickets at face
value without having to pay a PSL fee. Thus,
if there is competition among resellers bidding
for the PSLs themselves, even if the season
tickets are resold, then the team, rather than
the resellers, might still be capturing consumers’
surpluses.
This may occur but there are two offsetting
features of PSL auctions to date. First, the New
York Jets’ auction is the only one to date so
the surplus extraction, if it exists, cannot be
general. More typical is the simple setting of
PSL rates by seat location as in the New York
Giants case mentioned above. Second, resale is
nationalized—the resale agreement is between
the NFL (not individual teams) and the reseller.
As just mentioned, this type of choice by owners
reduces the chances for surplus extraction.
Our third modeling choice is to focus on reg-
ular season play. We further assume a league at
a given absolute level of play, the major league
level, and that all differences among teams at
that level are relative differences (extensions
are in Kesenne 2000; Marburger 1997; Rascher
1997). This builds Rottenberg’s (1956) outcome
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uncertainty observation into the model since
fans care about relative competition.
The remaining modeling choices are as fol-
lows. We restrict our attention to gate and
attendance-related local revenue that can be por-
trayed as proportional to ticket price (Heilmann
and Wendling 1976). This abstracts from local
TV revenue but, at least for the NFL, local
TV is a relatively minor item in team rev-
enues. We assume no team-specific contribu-
tions to the value of talent (Vrooman 1996).
Following the observations in Fort and Winfree
(forthcoming), the marginal product of talent is
assumed constant (constant returns to scale since
talent is the long-run choice of team owners)
so that characteristics of the underlying con-
test success function are essentially assumed
away.
We adopt the following notation.
I = {1, . . . , n} : an index of the set of teams
in the league;
wi : win percent of team i;
p: market price per unit of win percent;
ti (wi): ticket price at team i;
Di(ti(wi), wi): demand for tickets at team i;
MRPi : marginal revenue product of a unit of
win percent given a revenue maximizing choice
of ti .
And our assumptions are as follows:
Measurement Assumption: Talent used to
produce win percent is measured so that adding
one more unit of talent increases win percent by
one unit. This assumption has two implications.
First, the price of a unit of win percent, p, is also
the price of a unit of talent. Second, the marginal
revenue product of win percent, MRPi , is also
the marginal revenue product of talent, that is,
the demand for talent.
Ticket Price Assumptions : dti/dwi > 0;
Fans are willing to pay more for higher qual-
ity measured by win percent. Further, for any
choice of wi , ti (wi) is chosen to maximize rev-
enue for that wi , implying (∂Di/∂t i)(ti/Di) =
−1. We use ti(wi) to denote the revenue max-
imizing value of ti , given wi . It is to be noted
that this is not the same thing as maximizing
revenue with respect to wi .
Attendance Demand Assumptions : For any
given wi , ∂Di/∂t i < 0 so that ticket demand
slopes downward for any wi ; for any ti ,
∂Di/∂wi > 0 with ∂2Di/∂w2i < 0 so that in-
creased quality shifts demand to the right, but at
a decreasing rate.
Talent Demand Assumption: For any ti ,
∂MRPi/∂wi < 0, the demand for talent slopes
downward to the right.
Given all of the groundwork, above, the
profit function for team i is:
πi = ti (wi)[Di(ti(wi), wi)] − pwi,(1)
i = 1, . . . , n.
It has to be noted that, consistent with a season
ticket league, we assume that ticket demand
depends upon own ticket price and the team’s
own winning percent. At a maximum of profits,
the first-order conditions are:
dπi
dwi
= ti (wi)∂Di(ti(wi), wi)
∂wi
− p(2)







Equation (2) shows that all team owners set the
marginal revenue product of talent equal to the
marginal cost of talent. In Equation (2), even
though t is a function of w, our Ticket Price
Assumption (t is chosen to maximize revenue
for any value of w so that (∂Di/∂t i)(ti/Di) =
−1) ends up canceling out all terms involving
dt/dw.
Let t∗i = ti(w∗i ), D∗i = Di(ti(w∗i ), w∗i ) and
MRP∗i = MRPi (ti (w∗i ), w∗i ), i = 1, . . . , n, be
the profit-maximizing ticket price, and ticket
demand and talent demand evaluated at that
price, respectively. There is a league profit-
maximizing equilibrium at the optimal ticket
price vector, talent choice vector, and price of
talent, (t∗, w∗, p), if:








Equation (3) shows that, at a league profit-
maximizing equilibrium, marginal revenue prod-
uct of talent is equalized across the league,
that is:
MRP∗i − MRP∗j = 0, i, j = 1, . . . , n.(4)
For what follows, we observe two implica-
tions from Equation (4). First, given our Ticket
Price Assumption, this equilibrium also has total
revenue maximized for the league as a whole.
We make use of this observation in our specifi-
cation of the planner’s optimum shortly. Second,
in our model, it is possible for league revenues
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to be maximized, consistent with Equation (4)
and the Ticket Price Assumption, at a con-
stant vector w∗ = 0.500, that is, a perfectly
balanced league. However, Equation (2) makes
it clear that this can only occur if MRPi =
MRPj for all i, j = 1, . . . , n and for any com-
mon equilibrium value of w. As long as there is
variation in talent demand itself, the league can-
not be perfectly balanced. We make headway
at this point by imposing well-ordered varia-
tion in ticket demands across the teams in the
league:
Globally Invariant Drawing Power (GIDP)
Assumption: Assume the set of teams I =
{1, . . . , n} is listed in order of drawing power
such that:
i. i ≥ j, wi ≥ wj⇒Di(t, wi) ≥ Dj(t, wj )
for any common t ≥ 0.
ii. Let qD be the number of tickets de-
manded. Then, i ≥ j , wi ≥ wj ⇒ D−1i (qD, wi)
≥ D−1j (qD, wj ) for any common qD .
iii. i > j implies t∗i > t
∗
j in equilibrium.
Generally speaking, this is the well-known
larger- and smaller-revenue market distinction
common in the analysis of sports leagues. Under
the GIDP Assumption, team 1 occupies the
largest-revenue market; team 2 is in the next
largest-revenue market and so on down to team
n. This seems reasonable especially over any
relevant team or league planning horizon since
the location of teams helps determine their
drawing power and team location is completely
in the hands of the league itself.
We first look at competitive balance in the
decentralized profit-maximizing equilibrium of
the season ticket league (proofs of propositions
are in the Appendix):
PROPOSITION 1. In an n-team season ticket
league, with a competitive talent equilibrium,
with GIDP among teams, league revenues are
maximized at (t∗, w∗) satisfying Equation (4)






j , for all i > j .
Proposition 1 shows that the decentralized
league equilibrium exhibits competitive imbal-
ance with larger-revenue market teams winning
more than smaller-revenue market teams. As
discussed earlier, the only time this will not be
true is if (removing the GIDP Assumption) there
are no larger- and smaller-revenue markets to
begin with, that is, talent demand is identical in
all markets.
We next consider the planner’s optimum.
For simplicity, we have the planner take the
monopoly pricing power of each team as
given. Let Ci =
∫ ∞
ti
Di(ti, wi)dti and Ri =
tiDi(ti, wi) be fans’ surpluses and team’s sur-
plus in market i, respectively. [Correction added
on 20 May 2010 after first publication online on




Di(ti(wi), wi)dt i was
corrected to Ci =
∫ ∞
ti
Di(ti , wi)dti and Ri =
ti(wi)[Di(ti(wi), wi)] was corrected to Ri =
tiDi(ti, wi).] We use revenues for team sur-
pluses since (noted above) decentralized profit
maximization by owners in a season ticket
league leads to maximization of the league’s
total revenue anyway. The planner chooses the
vector w (the distribution of talent and, hence,
competitive balance) to maximize the sum of
surpluses, accounting for the adding-up con-
straint.





























Let t ′i = ti (w′i ), D′i = Di(ti(w′i ), w′i ) and
MRP′i = MRPi (ti(w′i ), w′i ), i = 1, . . . , n, be
the welfare-maximizing ticket price, and ticket
demand and talent demand evaluated at that
price, respectively. The two derivatives in the









where t ′i = ti (w′i ). [Correction added on 20
May 2010 after first publication online on 25



































where t ′i = ti (w′i ). [Correction added on 20
May 2010 after first publication online on 25






t ′i ∂Di∂wi =
∂t ′i
∂wi





In Equations (7) and (8), no terms containing
∂t ′i /∂wi appear since ticket revenues adjust
optimally. Further, in Equation (7), regardless
of which demand function is determined by a
particular wi , the quantity demanded at ti = ∞
must be zero, that is, Di |ti=∞ = 0, for any level
of team quality, if the owner charges an infinite
price then zero tickets are sold. Substituting









dt i − MRP′i + λ = 0,(9)










[Correction added on 20 May 2010 after first
publication online on 25 February 2010: the pre-
ceding paragraph has been amended in line with
the post-publication corrections for Equations
(7), (8) and (9), and Equation (9) was corrected.]
Finally, Equation (9) implies the following
for the planner’s equilibrium:
(10)











i, j = 1, . . . , n.
As our earlier observation on the league
profit-maximizing outcome, the first thing we
observe here is that it is possible for welfare
to be maximized, consistent with Equation (9)
and the Ticket Price Assumption, at a constant
vector w∗ = 0.500, that is, a perfectly balanced
league. Once again, identical demands allow
this to happen since both the right-hand side
of Equation (10) vanishes and MRP′i = MRP′j
for all i, j = 1, . . . , n and for all values of w.
However, as long as there is variation in tal-
ent demand itself, the league cannot be per-
fectly balanced since the right-hand side of
Equation (10) cannot be zero.
However, unlike the league profit-maximizing
outcome, adding the GIDP Assumption to the
Talent Demand Assumption does not settle any-
thing. Under these two assumptions (the lat-
ter has declining MRPiwith respect to wi), we
can only find that i > j implies (∂Di/∂wi) <
(∂Dj/∂wj ) in equilibrium with w∗i > w
∗
j ; the
marginal effect of an increase in talent on ticket
demand is larger in the smaller-revenue market
j . But this is not enough to settle the issue since
the sign of the right-hand side of Equation (10)
also rests on the range of integration of these
demand effects, that is, tj > t ′j and ti > t ′i .
Reasonably, t ′i > t ′j by the GIDP Assumption,
but the sign of Equation (10) rests on the mag-
nitude of this difference.
So, the difference between the league revenue-
maximizing equilibrium result in Equation (4)
and the planner’s optimum rests on the right-
hand side of Equation (10). On the right-hand
side of Equation (10), attendance for each team
changes directly with a change in that team’s
own talent level and surpluses follow suit. But
it is the size of the marginal fan surpluses with
respect to talent, in the smaller-revenue market
compared to the larger-revenue market, which
determines whether an increase in balance is
welfare enhancing. Without assuming the prob-
lem away, and with the virtue of highlighting
what ultimately will be an empirical issue, the
following can be shown.
PROPOSITION 2. In an n-team season ticket
league, with a competitive talent equilibrium,
with GIDP among teams, with a planner that
maximizes the sum of consumers’ and producers’




j /∂wj )dtj −∫ ∞
t ′i (∂D
′
i/∂wi)dt i > 0 then welfare is maxi-
mized at (t (w′), w′) where (1) t ′i > t ′j and
w′i > w′j , for all j = i and (2) w′i < w∗i and
w′j > w∗j , for all j < i.
Proposition 2 shows that the planner’s equi-
librium is also characterized by imbalance, but
less so than the decentralized league equilib-
rium, as long as the marginal fan surpluses
with respect to talent are larger in the smaller-
revenue market than the larger-revenue market
[i.e., the right-hand side of Equation (10) is pos-
itive]. Otherwise, it could be the case that the
league has chosen the welfare maximizing level
of balance [the right-hand side of Equation (10)
is zero], or that a decrease in balance could
be welfare enhancing [the right-hand side of
Equation (10) is negative].
To us, the intuition behind the condition










dt i goes as follows. In the last five seasons
(2003–2007), Forbes annual reports on NFL
team finances show that the New England Patri-
ots have been among the revenue leaders (sec-
ond, four times; fifth, the other) and the most
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successful team on the field among the revenue
leaders (14-2, 14-2, 10-6, 12-4, 16-0) (data can
be checked in Fort 2010). The Arizona Cardi-
nals were at the other end of the revenue spec-
trum (among the bottom five revenue teams four
times and dead last three times) and equally
unsuccessful (4-12, 6-10, 5-11, 8-8). In the
condition in Proposition 2, marginal surpluses
would be lower in New England (the larger-
revenue team) because the much higher level of
success on the field would have their fans with a
lower marginal willingness to pay for additional
winning. We emphasize that this occurs at the
margin —it is not that fans in smaller-revenue
markets are willing to pay more in total to see
winners than fans in larger-revenue markets. Of
course, this is just an example and rigorous
empirical work is required to pass judgment on
this theoretical construct.
We also note that the foregoing allows for the
possibility that the planner may choose balance
in such a way that a dynasty team dominates.
Technically, this is a postseason issue beyond
our regular season model. However, there is a
relationship since the winner of the regular sea-
son could be that dynasty team. The planner’s
optimal level of balance may result in the same
team winning year after year, albeit at a lower
expected value if the planner would increase
league balance. But from the planner’s perspec-
tive, this would occur because somehow the
presence of a dynasty team was also an impor-
tant element determining fan willingness to pay.
Of course, the ultimate value of Proposition
2 is that it states the conditions under which an
increase in balance will be welfare enhancing
in the form of a testable hypothesis. A suitable
statistical test is to determine whether the right-
hand side of Equation (10) is positive. Marginal
impacts of winning percent on attendance can
be obtained from estimating attendance demand.
Since ticket prices are also available, the data
required to do the test are observable.
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Starting from this basic welfare theory foun-
dation, what are the implications for the pol-
icy issues detailed in Section I? For the season
ticket league, whether or not improved balance
also improves welfare (defined as the sum of
fans’ and owners’ surpluses) depends on the
marginal impact on consumers’ surpluses in
larger-revenue and smaller-revenue markets due
to talent rearrangements in the two markets. The
verdict of empirical work on this ambiguity will
determine whether welfare will be improved by
enhancing competitive balance, reducing it, or
simply leaving it alone. This finding suggests
that settling the debate over competitive bal-
ance requires knowledge of the relative sizes
of changes in fan surpluses and ticket prices,
between larger- and smaller-revenue markets,
that accompany alterations in team qualities.
In essence, estimates of the impact of changes
in quality on attendance actually measure the
empirical importance of Rottenberg’s (1956)
uncertainty of outcome hypothesis; how does
attendance respond to increases in a team’s
own quality? Estimates of these impacts to date
have been somewhat clumsy and not clearly
directed to the issues raised in Proposition 2,
but they are evolving [the review in Szymanski
(2003) covers their findings while the review
in Fort (2006a) covers the shortcomings of
the approaches]. The analysis here dictates that
these estimates are required before making any
attempt to alter competitive balance.
To make these observations a bit more con-
crete, as mentioned earlier, some worry that the
NFL may be too balanced. This view rejects
Proposition 2 so that less balance would enhance
fans’ welfare. But this type of rejection is intu-
itive; only a careful econometric analysis of the
direct effects stated in Proposition 2 would actu-
ally decide the issue.
While identification of mechanisms to either
enhance or reduce competitive balance is out
of place given our findings, our examina-
tion of optimal competitive balance does offer
the following observation. In the event that
league choices are judged suboptimal, owners
in NALs cannot be expected to violate their
profit-maximizing choices of their own volition.
Also, there is no external regulatory agency to
enforce the talent redistribution in an NAL that
would have to occur. To date, there has only
been Congressional brow-beating of the vari-
ety cited in Section I (U.S. Senate 2001). Thus,
there is a regulatory structure hurdle to leap
in order to move decentralized league decision
making toward the welfare improvements under
the planner’s optimum.
From this perspective, one policy prescrip-
tion—breaking up NALs into competitive sep-
arate leagues—has two attractive features to
recommend it (see Horowitz 1976; Noll 1976;
Quirk and Fort 1999; Ross 1989, 1991). First,
the structure for this type of intervention already
exists under the antitrust laws. Fort (2007) lists
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the references in the argument over practical,
case-by-case antitrust intrusions into sports, but
the first important observation is that the struc-
ture for antitrust intervention is in place and
breaking up production units has been accom-
plished in the past (e.g., the AT&T break up
into seven “baby Bells,” finalized in 1982).
The second attractive feature of an antitrust
move to break up sports leagues involves the
chances for a Pareto improvement in fans’ wel-
fare. Proponents cited above have developed the
argument that, if two competing leagues were
created from an existing league, the result would
unleash competitive forces so that a team would
exist in every economically viable location with-
out sacrificing the goodwill investment that the
owners have already made in existing teams.
If the result of such a break up approaches
the competitive distribution of teams, Pareto
optimality would reign over the distribution of
talent among these teams with the sum of pro-
ducers’ and consumers’ surpluses maximized.
This would be the planner’s outcome with opti-
mal competitive balance detailed in this article.
Competition would distribute teams so that any
remaining smaller- and larger-revenue potential
among the franchises would approximate the
optimal distribution of talent in the planner’s
outcome in Equation (10) for the season ticket
league.
Other impacts of the imposition of compe-
tition have been covered in detail in the ref-
erences cited above. For example, well-known
from basic welfare analysis, moving from an
inefficient outcome to the planner’s surplus-
maximizing optimum, it will be the case that the
distribution of talent changes because there will
be more teams in more cities. As a result, teams
that had more talent may now have less. But
if this redistribution truly is a welfare improve-
ment, then gains in under-served markets will
more than offset.
To conclude our policy discussion, we are
not so naı̈ve as to believe that the sum of fan
and owner welfare matters in the policy process.
Indeed, public choice analysis often reveals that
social welfare may matter little in the policy pro-
cess. Every move away from any league’s profit-
maximizing choice will have distributional con-
sequences on players, owners, and fans. Indeed,
leagues have a variety of mechanisms for attain-
ing their own ends and the ones chosen and
favored by leagues must have favorable distri-
butional consequences for them. But identify-
ing the optimal level of competitive balance is
important because doing so sets the stage for the
analysis of the distributional consequences rel-
ative to welfare maximization; it is possible to
know the cost in terms of fan welfare of violat-
ing the planner’s optimum.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
We attempt to seek remedy for the absence
of considerations of the optimal level of
competitive balance in North American pro
sports leagues. We devise a planner’s optimal
talent distribution for regular season play that
maximizes the sum of fans’ and teams’ sur-
pluses. This outcome is compared to decentral-
ized, profit-maximizing outcome for a closed
league where season ticket sales dominate team
revenues (like in the NFL).
As long as owners in different locations
face variation in demand functions, the profit-
maximizing outcome yields competitive imbal-
ance. The balance that the season ticket league
has depends on the marginal surpluses created
in larger-revenue markets relative to smaller-
revenue markets following a planner’s alter-
ation in the distribution of talent. Theoretically,
the possibility remains that the league’s profit-
maximizing distribution of talent also maxi-
mizes fan welfare.
For policy implications, first, only careful
empirical tests can determine whether enhancing
or reducing balance is welfare improving for
our season ticket league. Careful estimates of
impacts of talent choice on attendance demand
for all teams are required in order to choose
intervention mechanisms that effectively hit the
optimal level of competitive imbalance. To date,
this type of careful assessment is missing in
the debate over competitive balance. Second,
unless it also maximizes profits, we do not
expect that owners will choose the optimal
level themselves. Currently, there is no external
regulatory structure governing NALs that could
impose the planner’s optimum using the variety
of mechanisms that are capable of changing
competitive balance. Third, the antitrust remedy
of breaking up the leagues does already have
the requisite legal structure and precedence.
Also, if the forces of competition can drive a
Pareto result, then the optimal level of balance
that maximizes the sum of fans’ and teams’
surpluses, detailed in this article, would be
achieved.
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There are many avenues for future work sug-
gested by this analysis. We utilize the compet-
itive talent market model most applicable to
NALs. But initial investigations by Szyman-
ski (2004), Szymanski and Kesenne (2004),
and Easton and Rockerbie (2005) suggest that
other leagues around the world may be bet-
ter treated with noncooperative models. Also,
extensions beyond gate demand to include
local TV will no doubt prove insightful, for
example, beyond the NFL (a league that sells
all games in a national contract). For that matter,
different owner objectives would produce differ-
ent decentralized league outcomes for compar-
ison to the planner’s optimum [most recently,
Fort and Quirk (2004) and Kesenne (2005)].
Further, we do not address the case where
a league might be dominated by single-game
ticket sales (more likely for, say, Major League
Baseball). Finally, ours is an assessment of opti-
mal balance during the regular season. While
regular season balance bears directly on playoff
accessibility, models of optimal playoff balance
remain for future work.
APPENDIX: PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS
PROPOSITION 1. By assumption, based on simple obser-
vation [item (iii) under our GIDP Assumption], t∗i > t
∗
j . We
seek to show that in equilibrium, w∗i > w
∗
j .
For w∗i > w
∗
j , the GIDP Assumption has MRPi > MRPj
for any 0 ≤ w ≤ 1 and for all j = i. Since our Talent
Demand Assumption has ∂MRPi /∂wi < 0, then MRPi >
MRPj for any 0 ≤ w ≤ 1 and for all j = i implies w∗i > w∗j .
PROPOSITION 2. Again, item (iii) under the GIDP Assum-









i /∂wi)dt i > 0 [the right-hand side of
Equation (10) is positive] then (1) w′i > w′j , for all j < i




j , for any j < i.
For any j < i, w′i > w′j follows lines similar to









i/∂wi)dti > 0. For
w′i > w′j , the GIDP Assumption has MRPi > MRPj for
any 0 ≤ w ≤ 1 and for all j < i. Since our Talent Demand
Assumption has ∂MRPi /∂wi < 0, MRPi > MRPj for any
0 ≤ w ≤ 1 and for all j = i implies w′i > w′j .
For w′i < w∗i , it has to be noted that first our Talent
Demand Assumption has ∂D∗i /∂wi > 0 and ∂D
∗





(∂Di/∂wi)dt i > 0. If we evaluate the plan-
ner’s optimum depicted in Equation (10) at w*, the decen-
tralized league equilibrium, then the planner’s optimum is









(∂Di/∂wi)dt i = 0. But for




(∂Dj /∂wj )dtj −∫ ∞
t∗
i
(∂Di/∂wi)dti > 0, the planner would have to move tal-
ent toward the smaller-revenue market, j , implying that
(locally, at least) w′i < w∗i . Then
∑n
i=1 wi =n/2 implies
w′j > w∗j , for all j < i. Moving from the league profit-
maximizing equilibrium to a planner’s optimum would be
in the direction of more competitive balance.
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